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Copp: Fifth Brigade at Verrieres Ridge

FIFTH BRIGADE
VERRIERES RIDGE
Terry Copp

T

he Fifth Canadian Infantry Brigade arrived
in France on 16 July 1944 during the worst
days of the battle of Normandy. The Allies had
expected heavy losses on the D-Day beaches
and then, once through the Atlantic Wall,
lighter casualties in a war of rapid movement.
The opposite had happened. The coastal
defences had been quickly breached, but then
there were only slow movement and horrendous
casualties. In one month more than 40,000
U.S. troops were killed, wounded or missing,
while almost 38,000 British and Canadian
troops shared the same fate. The Allied air
forces enjoyed total air superiority over the
battlefield, but in J u n e alone the cost was
6,200 aircrew. Soldiers on both sides were
beginning to say that it was 1914-1918 all over
again - a static battle of attrition with gains
measured in yards and thousands of dead.
Generals in their memoirs and historians in
their books on Normandy have usually focused
attention on controversies over Allied strategy,
especially the Montgomery-Eisenhower debate,
but the real problem was at the tactical, not the
strategic level. It is an axiom of military science
that the attacker needs a three-to-one margin
over the defender to have a reasonable chance
of success. If the defence is well dug in, even
better odds are required. The Allies had landed
in Normandy prepared for a war of mobility in
which the tactical air forces and the armoured
regiments would dominate the battlefield.
Instead, they were confronted with a German
army able to maintain a continuous perimeter
and a defence in depth.
Fifth Brigade's introduction to the battlefield
came on 18 J u l y as p a r t of Operation
"Goodwood," when the Black Watch forced a

crossing of the Orne opposite the race course
in Caen. The next morning the Regiment de
Maisonneuve and the Calgary Highlanders went
into action and by the evening of the 21st all
three battalions held positions on the lower
slope of Verrieres Ridge. On the night of the
22nd the Maisonneuves were assigned to clear
the village of Etavaux as part of a British (43rd
West Riding Division) operation to capture
Maltot on the west bank of the Orne. The
Maisonneuves captured Etavaux taking more
than 100 prisoners from the 272nd Division
but their own losses were 10 killed, 48 wounded
and 50 evacuated for battle exhaustion. 1 The
Maisonneuves had lost more than two hundred
riflemen in just four days of combat and since
French-speaking reinforcements were in short
supply they could not be brought back up to
strength. The Maisies were placed in divisional
reserve, leaving Fifth Brigade with just two
battalions for its next operation.
While the battle for control of Etavaux and
Maltot was fought, Lieut-General Miles
Dempsey, the commander of Second British
Army, met with Guy Simonds, CO of II
Canadian Corps, to plan a new offensive in the
Canadian sector. On 21 July Montgomery had
issued a directive which required II Canadian
Corps to remain "as active as possible" so that
the enemy would believe that "we contemplate
a major advance towards Falaise and Argentan.
. . . The Germans must," Montgomery wrote,
"be induced to build up strength east of the
Orne so our affairs on the western flank can
proceed with greater speed." 2
This directive is often cited as proof that the
Canadian assault on Verrieres Ridge, code45
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named "Spring", was planned as a holding
action to assist the American breakout,
Operation "Cobra"; but on 22 July Montgomery
changed his plans. He explained a new scheme
to Eisenhower in a letter which stated that he
was not going to "hold back or wait" for the
Americans. Instead, II Canadian Corps,
reinforced with two British armoured divisions,
was to attack on 25 July, capturing Verrieres
Ridge and advancing south to secure the next
high ground at Point 122 near Cranmesnil.
Two days later XII British Corps, west of the
Orne, would once again try to capture the Hill
112 area. Once this was accomplished VIII
Corps, the armoured divisions restored to it,
would thrust down the road to Falaise. All of
these operations, described as a series of leftright-left blows, would culminate in a new
Goodwood using "three or four armoured
divisions" to break through to Falaise. 3

S

econd Canadian Corps was still operating
u n d e r Second British Army in July.
S i m o n d s d i s c u s s e d t h e d e t a i l s of t h e
operation "fully" with General Dempsey and
obtained his approval, b u t "Spring" was
Simonds' plan. 4 He designed it as a threephase battle involving the two Canadian
infantry divisions and 2nd Canadian
Armoured Brigade, plus Guards and 7th
Armoured Divisions. Second Tactical Air
Force was to devote its full resources to the
battle and the medium guns of three Army
Groups Royal Artillery (AGRAs) were to
supplement eight field regiments. In the first
phase 3rd Division was to capture Tilly-LaCampagne while 2nd Division seized Maysur-Orne and Verrieres village. Phase II
required 2nd Division to capture Fontenayle-Marmion and Rocquancourt while 7th
Armoured Division attacked Cranmesnil and
3rd Division assaulted Garcelles-Secqueville.
These moves were to set the stage for the
Guards Armoured Division to seize the high
ground a b o u t C i n t h e a u x and the river
crossings at Bretteville-sur-Laize, 5 the same
objectives listed for the exploitation phase of
Operation "Goodwood".

Allied intelligence on enemy defences in the
area was limited by poor weather which
prevented photo-reconnaissance. Prisoners of
war from the 272nd Division brought news of
the attempted assassination of Hitler, Order of
Battle information, and stories of their ten-day
trek to Normandy from the Spanish border,
but nothing was learned about the strength or
location of the battle groups of 9th SS and 2nd
Panzer Divisions supporting them. 6
Intelligence officers also failed to appreciate
that 272nd Division had committed two of its
three regiments to the defence of St. Andre and
St. Martin. This was the main line of German
resistance on the left flank and it was held by
two battalions and elements of two others. The
division's artillery, anti-tank regiments, scores
of mortars, and a Nebelwerfer regiment were
also committed to the defence of the area. 7
Simonds believed that a repetition of the
daylight attack of 19 July had little chance of
success so he decided to undertake Phase I in
full darkness, hoping to be past the first line of
enemy resistance before daybreak. Since the
enemy overlooked the area from the west side
of the Orne as well as the ridge, the troops
would have to wait until close to midnight
before beginning to move to their forming up
places. This meant that H-Hour was delayed to
0330 hours, leaving less than three hours of
darkness for Phase I.8
The Anglo-Canadian forces had very limited
experience with night attacks. Second Division
had begun to study the problem in 1943 when
Major-General E.L.M. Burns was in command.
A divisional night fighting course offered
instruction in orientation and controlling
troops 9 but everyone who has been on a night
exercise in strange country knows how difficult
it is to keep direction even when no one is
shooting at you. The British Army's operational
research group had devised a number of
navigational aids for nightfighting but their
focus was on vehicles, not marching troops. 10
Artificial moonlight, searchlights bounced off
clouds, was the only practical measure available
to assist infantry.
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"Spring" was supposed to involve four
divisions but most of the troops were assigned
to the later phases. The night attack involved
just three battalions, each committing between
300 and 350 men to the assault. This meant
that 272nd Division and the Panzer battle
groups, who were well dug-in with carefully
p r e p a r e d i n t e r l o c k i n g fields of fire,
outnumbered the attackers by a considerable
margin. The Corps Commander counted on
darkness and the artillery to overcome these
odds and get his troops forward.
S i m o n d s 1 o r d e r s left t h e divisional
commanders with little latitude. H-Hour had
been determined and both air strikes and the
medium artillery program of harassing fire on
known German positions were set. MajorGeneral Charles Foulkes, the General Officer
Commanding (GOC) 2nd Canadian Infantry
Division, had to determine quickly how best to
carry out a divisional attack while two of his
nine battalions were out of action recovering
from their mauling in "Atlantic."11 Foulkes
faced a difficult situation. In theory his troops
held a line from St. Andre-sur-Orne along the
road which ran on the lower slope of Verrieres
through Beauvoir farm to the village of HubertFolie. In practice this was far from the case,
particularly on the right flank where the
Camerons had been struggling just to hold on
to parts of St. Andre. When Fifth Brigade was
informed that for the first phase of "Spring" the
St. Andre-Beauvoir road would be the start
line, Brigadier W.J. Megill, commander of 5
Brigade, sent two officers to the village to
prepare a tactical headquarters. They arrived
without any difficulty but when they opened
the door of a likely house they heard German
voices and promptly withdrew.
Megill decided to go and see the situation for
himself. The Camerons had lost a number of
officers in the past few days, including their
CO, but the acting commander, Major J.
Muncie, had a good grasp of the situation. He
told Megill that the Camerons did not control
most of St. Andre, never mind the adjacent
village of St. Martin-de-Fontenay. 1 2 The
Camerons faced continuous mortar fire,
frequent enemy c o u n t e r a t t a c k s and the

constant infiltration of small groups of enemy
soldiers. As late as the morning of the 24th a
patrol of approximately 25 Germans appeared
in a quarry to the left-rear of battalion
headquarters. Fortunately a section of the
Toronto Scottish medium machine guns was
deployed in the area and the enemy patrol was
destroyed. 13
Megill w e n t i m m e d i a t e l y to division
headquarters to ask to have the Maisonneuves,
now in divisional reserve, returned to the
brigade so they could clear the start line for the
Calgaries. Foulkes refused, insisting that Sixth
Brigade did hold St. Andre and could clear St.
Martin. After some acrimonious discussion
Foulkes agreed to place the Camerons under
Fifth Brigade to secure the start line. 14 The
Camerons began this task on the night of the
24th, just hours before "Spring" was to begin.
"Stiff opposition" was met from the beginning
and it was necessary to keep reinforcing the
Camerons' attackforce, which lost three officers
in the first hour. By midnight the actual start
line seemed to be quiet. 15 This did not mean
that St. Martin-de-Fontenay had been cleared
nor had anyone attempted to occupy the factory
area 300 yards south of the St. Martin church.
This complex of buildings, with a single
prominent tower housing machinery for a mine
shaft, was targetted in the divisional artillery
plan as part of a rolling barrage which was to
lead the Calgary Highlanders from their check
line, the St. Andre-Verrieres road where the
barrage would begin, to their objective, Maysur-Orne. The Germans occupied the mine
workings in strength and maintained wellconcealed positions throughout the
southeastern fringe of St. Martin.
Foulkes, by retaining the Maisonneuves in
divisional reserve and assigning the Black
Watch to Phase II, left Megill with a single
battalion which had been briefed to advance
quickly, two companies up, following the
barrage into May.16 With hindsight it can be
argued that Megill should have intervened and
ordered the Calgary Highlanders to use at least
one company to clear and occupy St. Martin
and the factory area, though how this change
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up east of the St.
Andre-May road.
Able company on
the left "discovered
that the area was
not clear" and "had
to fight to get on the
start line." They hit
the check line on
time a n d s w u n g
f u r t h e r e a s t to
bypass the factory
area, b u t came
under small arms
fire from the eastern
edge of St. Martin.
Major C a m p b e l l
h a d to c h o o s e
quickly b e t w e e n
detaching men to
deal with t h i s
position
and
pressing on to May
with the barrage.
He chose to keep
his
men moving,
Canadian soldier in May-sur-Orne
"leaving
enemy
(NAC PA 131357)
b e h i n d in slit
trenches and dugouts who later on were to fire on us to our
could have been communicated to the Calgaries
cost."19
is not immediately apparent. Throughout the
hours of darkness the battalion was moving
Campbell's men advanced towards the
from Point 67 to their forming up places and
eastern edge of May and informed battalion
company commanders were fully taxed keeping
headquarters that they had reached their
their men together. A large part of D company,
objective.20 The artillery continued to pound
including company headquarters, did in fact
the village with some shells falling short on the
get lost and had to return to Point 67 to remen waiting on the sloping field. According to
orient themselves. 17 At the last moment Lieut. Lieutenant Morgandeen, the company stayed
Colonel Donald MacLaughlan, the Calgary CO,
in that position "only about fifteen minutes."
did change the plan, ordering one of his reserve
He told the Historical Officer, who interviewed
companies to advance with the barrage to
him
four days after the battle, that "light was
protect the right flank of the assault companies.
breaking and our artillery remained on the
MacLaughlan's concern with the wooded areas
objective. There was no area between the
along the River Orne was no doubt justified,
position we had reached and our final
but this change did not address the problem of
consolidation position where we might have
St. Martin or the factory and left him with only
set up a proper defensive area. Hence we came
the small part of D company which had arrived
back
and took up position to the right [east] of
as a reserve. 18
St. Martin." 21
What MacLaughlan called his "main effort"
force, Major J o h n Campbell's Able company
and Major Nixon's Charlie company, were lined

Campbell's men were immediately pinned
down by the enemy force they had bypassed
during their advance. Heavy mortaring kept
49
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The church at St. Martin-de-Fontenay is in the centre of the photograph.
(Photo taken in 1946).

the men in their slit trenches and Campbell,
who had lost his wireless link, was not able to
get a m e s s a g e t h r o u g h to b a t t a l i o n
headquarters to inform MacLaughlan of their
withdrawal from May.22 MacLaughlan, Megill,
Foulkes and Simonds all believed that Able
company was on its objective.
Baker company was to advance on Able
company's right flank. They met machine-gun
fire the moment the start line was crossed. Fire
from a German outpost at the checkline, the
sunken Verrieres road, dispersed the company
and the commanding officer Major C.C. Nixon
was killed. The company continued south "on
a magnetic bearing of 197 degrees" but two of
the platoons were forced to the ground "after
meeting enfilade fire from eight machine guns
in St. Martin." The third platoon, commanded
by Lieutenant J o h n Moffat, was on the left
flank and continued south, arriving at a

Verrieres Ridge is in the distance.
(PMR 90-411)

"waterhole on the eastern edge of May-surOrne. The village was still being shelled by
Allied artillery "which came in so low" the men
had "to take shelter from it in dead ground." 23
When the barrage stopped Moffat set off to
recce the crossroads in May. While he was
gone it began to get light. Sergeant Wynder
told the Historical Officer that, "As first light
came we saw three Tiger tanks and two SP
guns. J u s t along the south side of the road"
from May to Fontenay. "When we were spotted
by them the tanks and SPs tore in behind the
ramps of a blockhouse and began firing."
Lieutenant Moffat returned from May and
decided that "the objective was held by too
strong a force for 20 men and one PIAT to
contest." They proceeded "slowly and carefully"
back towards St. Andre and met men from Able
company "who told us the rest of our company
was in the area j u s t east of the factory. We
moved to this area and took up a common front
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in defense with the rest of Baker company
between 0730 and 0830 hours." 24 All of the
officers except Moffat were now casualties and
CSM Ralph Wilson and Sergeant Jack Brandon
were preparing to lead their platoons against
the German positions in the factory area. 25 No
one contacted battalion headquarters.
Charlie company, assigned to the area west
of the main road, ran into opposition "from
both flanks" from the start line on. "Three men
of the leading section were killed." Scouts were
sent forward to "see if we could clear out this
opposition" but it was "too dark and too difficult
to clear the enemy out at night." It "was cloudy
and smoky and so thick we could not see
anything. "26 The company commander decided
to wait until morning. As dawn broke Charlie
moved towards May. They "advanced in single
file up the ditches on either side of the road to

the factory area. There, as before, were some
snipers and also some groups of men who
wanted to surrender." The advance continued
using the lefthand ditch which was very deep.
The lead platoon, under Lieutenant Orville
Mageli, was within 200 yards of May when
Major Sherwin Robinson called an Orders
Group. He knew that "men had been in Maysur-Orne without meeting any fire, notably the
signals sergeant" 27 who had twice entered the
village in an attempt to lay a cable to A
company. 28
It was now 0900 and Robinson ordered
Charlie company to clear the buildings on both
sides of the road "right up close to the church."
They "found no one." At this point snipers to
the rear of the church and from the right began
to fire on Mageli's platoon. Over on the left 13
platoon had "worked up in extended order to

Looking back to St. Martinfrom the north edge ofMay-sur-Orne, the mine tower in the "factory" area is clearly
visible as is the church in St. Martin. Point 67 may be seen in the background. (Photo taken in 1946).
(PMR 90-412)
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the houses. There were many snipers in the
orchards to the east of the houses and the
platoon had a sticky time. About the same time
we came under fire of what seemed to be our
own artillery."29 This new hazard was in fact
the barrage intended to lead the Black Watch
from May to Fontenay. Charlie company,
which knew nothing about this plan, took
cover in the ditches along both sides of the road
and remained there throughout the Black
Watch attack.
The two platoons of the Calgary's reserve
company that did arrive at the forming up
place improvised a company headquarters and
set off behind Baker company. The situation
quickly became confused. One platoon became
involved in a fire fight with four light machine
guns located in an orchard just south of the
start line. Lieutenant E.A. Michon, who
commanded the other platoon, learned that
the acting CO had been wounded and went
forward to take command. Michon led the
company "straight down the wheat fields" to
what he thought was the east side of May-surOrne. The men took up positions around a
church which turned out to be in St. Martin not
May.30
Lieutenant Michon told the Historical Officer
that "in the confusion of the night and the
battle, I lost my sense of time and space. . . ."
With daybreak Michon, still convinced he was
in May, organized his men to systematically
clear the eastern part of the village. "We took
many prisoners there and on our way through
the eastern edges of the factory district. While
there I met a 'B' Coy FOO (Artillery Forward
Observation officer) who also thought we were
in May-sur-Orne." Michon did not learn where
he really was until the Black Watch arrived in
the area shortly after 0700. 31
The Calgary attack on May had yielded close
to a hundred prisoners and inflicted other
casualties, but their obj ective was still in enemy
hands. The forming-up area for the Black
Watch, not to mention their intended start line,
was still dominated by German mortar and
machine-gun fire. This situation was the result
of the failure to recognize that St. Martin and
its factory area were well organized, strongly
held, defensive positions. The first phase of

"Spring" should have been an attack on St.
Martin, not May-sur-Orne.
Given the difficulty of their task, the Calgaries
had shown initiative and determination, and
some skill in the art of mounting a night attack.
Today, military training manuals emphasize
what is called C3, command, control and
communications, as the key to successful
operations. Apart from the jargon, the concept
appears obvious to veterans of the Fifth Brigade.
The difficulty is that command and control are
not possible without communication and in
1944 infantry companies frequently lost touch
with their battalion headquarters and each
other. Quite apart from casualties to platoon
and company signals sections, the back-packed
No. 18 set was subject to interference and
frequent failure. The Calgaries do not seem to
have paid enough attention to providing backup for wireless communication. MacLaughlan
and Megill were left to guess at what had
happened to the four Calgary companies.
During the three hours of darkness and
confusion the failure to send runners to report
to battalion headquarters was understandable,
but between 0700 and 0900 hours, when the
Black Watch were preparing their attack, only
the reserve company made contact with
MacLaughlan. 32

P

hase II of "Spring" was scheduled to begin
at first light with the Royal Regiment of
Canada seizing Rocquancourt and the Black
Watch advancing from May to c a p t u r e
Fontenay-le-Marmion. These attacks were to
take place in conjunction with an advance by
7th Armoured Division attacking between the
Canadian brigades to capture the high ground
near the village of Cranmesnil.
The Black Watch left the area north of Beauvoir
farm at 0330 hours and moved in a long, snaking
column along the road to St. Andre. A few
casualties were inflicted by machine gun fire but
it was not until the lead companies turned south
towards their planned assembly area near the
church in St. Martin that real resistance was met. 33
St. Martin was far from clear of the enemy. Along the
east edge of the build-up area there were "high walls
and hedgessurrounding orchards. Next to these
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were three or four knocked-out Panther tanks."
34
The whole area was studded with machine
gun and sniper posts with "weapon slits outside
the walls and hedges and dug-outs and scurry
holes inside." 35 The artificial moonlight did
nothing to help locate these positions and in
the darkness everyone was aware that valuable
time was slipping away. J u s t as some degree
of control was established, an undetected enemy
post opened fire on the battalion's command
group, mortally wounding Lieut.-Colonel Stuart
Cantlie and injuring Major Eric Modzfeldt, the
senior company commander. It was now almost
0530 hours and the first faint light of dawn was
visible on the horizon. Most of the battalion
was still strung out along the hedgerow leading
to St. Martin, instead of at the start line for the
attack on Fontenay.
Command of the battalion passed to the
senior surviving company commander, a tall,
slim, twenty-four-year-old, Major Phillip
Griffin.36 He faced a daunting task. His fellow
officer, Major Edwin Bennett, recalled the
moment of crisis in an interview recorded just
five days after the battle:
Major Griffin's problem w a s t h a t the battalion w a s r a t h e r
extended. The companies were still intact a n d u n d e r good
control b u t t h e t h r e a t of dispersion a n d of possible
confusion w a s near. Light w a s breaking a n d we were
u n d e r fire from the ridge. We h a d j u s t m a d e contact with
t h e t a n k s in St. Andre-sur-Orne. They h a d moved into the
orchard as a h a r b o u r a n d h a d lost two t a n k s coming
t h r o u g h t h e town. F u r t h e r m o r e it w a s getting close to Hh o u r for t h e a t t a c k a n d t h e battalion w a s far from the start
line. Soon the artillery fire would begin a n d would be of
no value. Major Griffin h a d to m a k e time to liaise with t h e
artillery and, if possible, retime their shoot. He h a d to get
t h e t a n k c o m m a n d e r into t h e picture a n d m a k e u s e of his
force in any new p l a n s . Before this could be done, he h a d
to find o u t t h e situation in St. Andre-sur-Orne from t h e
C a m e r o n s of C a n a d a a n d obtain w h a t reports he could on
t h e Calgaries a n d t h e situation at May-sur-Orne.
Major Griffin is a brilliant officer of absolutely o u t s t a n d i n g
courage a n d ability. His take-over in this strained and
ticklish situation w a s s u p e r b . There w a s no uncertainty
whatever in his actions. He foresaw only a delay, which
would at t h e outside be two h o u r s , while he re-arranged
timings a n d obtained essential information. The plan for
t h e attack would be t h e s a m e as h a d been previously set.
In t h e m e a n t i m e t h e battalion w a s to move to St. Andres u r - O r n e a n d occupy t h e cross r o a d s there on t h e Verrieres
road so t h a t t h e m e n would be less obvious targets for the
fire from t h e left flank a n d so t h a t a firm b a s e for
operations would be available. So complete w a s his

St
Martin-de-Fontenay
May-sur-Orne (bottom).

and the
"factory"
(top)
and
Photo taken on 7 August 1944.
(LCMSDS)

53

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1992

9

Canadian Military History, Vol. 1 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 5

control a n d so well trained the battalion t h a t this was
done at once a n d in incredibly good order. All the
c o m p a n i e s were in their new positions within 20 minutes
of t h e conclusion of t h e 'O' Group. Up to this time oui
casualties, aside from the three serious losses in leadership
were slight, a m o u n t i n g to ten or fifteen altogether. 3 7

Griffin's actions between 0600 and 0930
hours when the Black Watch attack began,
cannot be fully reconstructed. What is known
is that a new artillery fire plan was agreed upon
and tank support arranged with Major Walter
Harris, the commander of B squadron, First
Hussars. 3 8 The artillery plan was simply a
repetition of the original scheme to lead the
battalion to Fontenay but Griffin decided to
move directly to the start line rather than by
the road to May. He now wanted the tanks to
protect his right flank rather than the left as in
the original plan, hoping that the promised
advance of 7th Armoured Division would fully
occupy the enemy to the east. At about 0830
hours Griffin made contact with Lieutenant
Michon, commanding D company of the
Calgaries, and asked him to "clear out the
factory area." Michon "went forward to recce
to discover very heavy machine-gun fire coming
from the factory area on the right and from the
knocked out tanks on the high ground on our
left." Michon told Griffin that, "this was too
strong opposition for one company to clear
without artillery support or smoke. He then
asked me to go forward to see if the Start Line
was secure and to send him word as he had no
i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g o u r forward
companies." 39 The Black Watch start line was
a road angling out of May-sur-Orne and Michon
would not agree to recce it for Griffin. He failed
to contact the other Calgary companies and
then reported to battalion headquarters.
MacLaughlan ordered him to "try and get
forward to the objective." Captain Harrison
and the missing part of D company had arrived
but their attempt to "get forward" was stopped
cold by an intense mortar barrage which caused
"very heavy casualties." 40
Griffin had sent a patrol to May-sur-Orne
consisting of his intelligence officer, Lieutenant
L.R. Duffield, Sergeant Benson and one scout.

Major F.P. Griffin
(Black

Watch

Archives)

The patrol moved straight down route 162
"without using the ditches" 41 and walked into
the centre of May-sur-Orne without seeing or
h e a r i n g a n y G e r m a n s or a n y Calgary
Highlanders. At the crossroads in the centre of
the village they turned left towards the road
which marked the battalion start line. Fifty
yards before reaching it they were fired on by a
machine gun and Duffield returned to tell
Griffin that the Calgaries were not in May and
that the machine gun would be able to fire into
the flank of the battalion. Griffin's response
was to order Duffield to lead a reinforced
patrol, six men, back to May to "take out" the
machine gun. 42

54
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Duffield's patrol was not the only force to
visit May-sur-Orne that morning. Major Walter
Harris, c o m m a n d i n g the First H u s s a r s
squadron, had listened to divisional and brigade
orders "to go ahead" with Phase II and had sent
one of his four troops forward. This troop
"located some of the Calgary Highlanders in a
hollow north of May, badly cut up and in need
of stretcher bearers, ammunition, etc." Leaving
two tanks to assist the Calgaries, the troop
proceeded to feel its way cautiously into the
village. At the main crossroads the lead tank
was holed by an anti-tank gun and the troop
withdrew to a hull down position on the north
edge of the village.43
Meanwhile Major Griffin was conferring with
Brigadier Megill, who had learned through the
gunner radio net that a fire plan, timed for
0930 hours, had been requested by the Black

Lieut.-Colonel Stuart Cantlie
(Black Watch Archives)

Watch. Megill recalls that Griffin was on the
verandah of a building on the forward edge of
St. Martin looking out towards May. There did
not seem to be any shelling at that time and
Major Griffin calmly explained his plan and
pointed it out on the ground. Megill thought it
looked like "a dicey proposition" and suggested
that the Black Watch secure May-sur-Orne
first. According to Megill, Griffin replied that
they had "patrols into May" and he doubted
that it was held on "a continuous basis." Griffin
felt sure that if the Black Watch attack went in,
then once it had passed its start line the
Calgary Highlanders could "fill in behind, on
into May-sur-Orne." Megill accepted this
assessment and returned to his headquarters. 44
The Black Watch had to move quickly if its
lead companies were to take full advantage of
the timed artillery program. Unfortunately the
Hussars were delayed owing to the narrowness
of the sunken approach road and when the
first tanks arrived at the forming-up place the
Black Watch had already begun to move
forward.45 The tanks quickly started across
the open ground, aiming for the gap between
May and the ridge east of the village. Accurate,
large-calibre, anti-tank fire struck the lead
tanks immediately and the others sought dead
ground. By 1020 hours six tanks had been lost
and Major Harris wounded. At least one troop
reported reaching the start line but their tanks
were then caught in enfilade fire from the
eastern edge of May.46
The Black Watch, proudest of regiments, did
not falter. The men were heavily mortared all
the way to the start line but kept moving. With
two companies up and the two other companies
close behind the regiment walked into the jaws
of a trap. The Germans with excellent fire
control had been occupying May in strength
throughout the battle. They now emerged,
reinforced b y P a n z e r b a t t l e g r o u p s ,
overwhelming the Black W a t c h - H u s s a r s
attack. 47 On the ridge to the south and east of
the village the troops in the main German line
of resistance, complete with dug-in gun and
mortar positions and packets of hull down
t a n k s with a t t e n d a n t Panzer grenadiers,
watched in awe as the Black Watch moved
forward.
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May-sur-Orne (left) and Fontenay-le-Marmion (right). The "factory" south of St. Martin may be seen at the
top of the photograph. Note the shape of the fields in the centre which correspond to the crest ofVerrieres
Ridge. The minor road running northeastfrom May was the Black Watch start line.
(LCMSDS)
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Taylor was wounded before Griffin and
approximately 60 men crossed the crest of the
ridge. One survivor, Private Montreuil, reported
that Captain J o h n Kemp, commanding D
company, urged Major Griffin to call off the
attack but Griffin replied "that the orders were
to attack and that the battalion would therefore
carry on."49 On top of the ridge the remnant of
the battalion "ran directly into a strong and
exceptionally well camouflaged enemy
position." 30 Tanks and self-propelled guns
were concealed in haystacks and intense closerange fire forced the men to ground. Griffin,
who may have been the only officer left, ordered
a withdrawal -"every man to make his way
back as best he could." Not more than fifteen
were able to do so. Griffin's body was later
found "lying among those of his men." 51
The Black Watch suffered 307 casualties on
25 July. Five officers and 118 other ranks were
killed or died of wounds, 101 were wounded
and of the 83 taken prisoner 21 were wounded.
As the official historian has noted, "Except for
the Dieppe operation, there is no other instance
in the Second World War where a Canadian
battalion had so many casualties in a single
day."52
Lieut-Colonel Donald MacLaughlan
(NAC PA 183990)

Captain J o h n Taylor described the advance
in a letter to his father dated 15 August 1944:
To begin with I might say that you need never be ashamed
of having belonged to the Black Watch . . . We started
across country at 0900 hours. By then the Jerries were
thoroughly awake as to what was going on and from the
start we had trouble from very heavy machine gunning
from the flanks, mortars and artillery fire. The troops were
steady as a rock and we kept going. I was the left forward
company and on my right was B company, then
commanded by Sergeant Foam, all the officers having
been knocked out. We overran two strong points, then I
got hit so I can't be accurate as to the rest of the story but
I understand they got to the objective.48

The battle did not end with the destruction
of the Black Watch. The brigade message log
portrays a scene of confused fighting on the
northern edge of May lasting into the early
afternoon. At 1615 hours a smokescreen was
laid across the front and Brigadier Megill
ordered the Calgaries to withdraw into St.
Andre. Elsewhere on the Corps front prospects
were equally dismal. The North Nova Scotia
Highlanders and Fort Garry Horse had been
mauled in their operation against Tilly-LaCampagne and in the centre the brilliant
success of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry in
capturing Verrieres village could not be followed
up. The Royal Regiment of Canada and C
squadron of the First Hussars bypassed
Verrieres heading for Rocquancourt but they
ran into a "hurricane of fire" and took heavy
losses. To their right the 1st Royal Tank Regiment
encountered accurate long-range fire as soon
as it moved forward. 53
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May-sur-Orne
(NAC PA

This tentative advance by one British
squadron was not part of 7th Armoured
Division's planned attack for Simonds had
cancelled the armoured advance. The 1st
Royal Tank Regiment was under orders to
assist the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry in
Verrieres and was not part of a larger
operation. 54 Despite his caution in committing
the armoured division, Simonds still believed
that some of the objectives of Phase II could be
won. At 1730 hours he issued orders to renew
the offensive. Second Division was to capture
Rocquancourt and May-sur-Orne and then at
dawn on the 26th, Fontenay-le-Marmion would
be attacked. 55 The Germans had other ideas
and throughout the early evening hours pressed
a series of major counterattacks against Fourth
Brigade,
w h i c h m a d e an a d v a n c e to
Rocquancourt out of the question. 56 There was
less pressure on the Fifth Brigade front and an

131352)

attack by the Regiment de Maisonneuve
scheduled for 1900 hours was allowed to go
ahead though it is difficult to discern what this
move was supposed to accomplish.
The Maisonneuves were to advance down
either side of the road to May, with Major
Ostiguy leading C company on the right and
Major Massie's B company advancing via the
factory area. D company under Captain Robert
was to set out at H+15 to clear out the woods
on the right flank and then seize the quarry
northwest of May. The enemy still occupied
the factory area in strength and the barrage
provided by two field and four medium
regiments was of little assistance. Indeed,
once past the start line they were fired on from
St. Andre. Ostiguy's men reached the diagonal
woods about 400 yards north of May before
enemy fire made further progress impossible. 57
59

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1992

15

Canadian Military History, Vol. 1 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 5

[NAC PA

114507)

At 2034 hours the Maisonneuves reported:
"Both forward companies pinned down in line
with factory by MGs along road. It is impossible
to have artillery engage as target is in our
rear. "58 Forty-five minutes later, when it became
clear that German resistance was growing,
Megill ordered the Maisies to return to St.
Andre where they were to spend the next four
days holding the village and attempting to
secure St. Martin. During the course of
Operation "Spring" the Maisonneuves suffered
12 fatal and more than 40 non-fatal casualties.

each company and placing it in an all-around
defensive position. Regrettably, Stott was
wounded "when a crump of mortar" struck him
in the shoulder. "During this same period
Major John Campbell staggered into battalion
headquarters" 60 seriously wounded. Captain
Ross Ellis took over command. That night the
Calgaries were sent to join the Black Watch in
the rear area. They had lost five officers and
172 other ranks killed, wounded and missing.
Every company commander who had gone into
battle the previous night was a casualty. 61

The Calgary Highlanders had been ordered
to withdraw to St. Andre on the evening of 25
July but the companies were scattered and out
of touch.
Megill relieved Lieut.-Colonel
MacLaughlan who was exhausted by the day's
events and Major Vern Stott, the second-incommand, came forward to re-organize.59Megill
told Stott to plan the defence of the area and
this task was quickly accomplished by visiting

On the morning of 26 July 1944 Fifth Brigade
began the first day of its second week at the
front. More than one thousand men, roughly
one fifth of the total strength of the brigade and
more than half of its infantry rifle strength,
were killed, wounded, prisoners of war or
exhaustion casualties.
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T

he battles for May-sur-Orne and Verrieres
Ridge were soon to be rationalized as
operations which had greatly assisted the
American breakout from St. Lo. But, in the
immediate aftermath of what had seemed like
a week of disasters, the senior officers of II
Canadian Corps were forced to think about the
events differently. Simonds met with both
Montgomery and Dempsey to discuss "Spring"
and then talked with his two divisional
commanders. 62 The British Generals must
have had some reservations about Simonds'
c o n d u c t of t h e b a t t l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y h i s
persistence in continuing daylight attacks
which, like Canadian operations on the last
day of "Goodwood," had been marked by heavy
casualties to infantry battalions. Infantry was
a terribly scarce resource in 21 Army Group
and it seems unlikely that Montgomery or
Dempsey would have permitted a British
general to press such costly operations in the
way the Canadians had. 63
For Simonds, "Spring" was not a failure of
c o m m a n d b u t a d e m o n s t r a t i o n of t h e
inadequacies of individual Canadian units. 64
Brigadier D.G.B. C u n n i n g h a m and the
commanding officers of two of his Ninth Brigade
battalions were fired for refusing to press the
attack against Tilly.65 Major-General Keller,
whom the British had suggested replacing in
early July, 66 was retained in command, perhaps
because he had followed orders and demanded
that Cunningham mount a new attack. MajorGeneral Foulkes was also left in command.
Foulkes had functioned as little more than an
observer during the first week of battle. He had
received an o u t l i n e p l a n from Corps
headquarters and prepared a divisional plan
without
consulting
his
brigadiers.
Communications with the assault troops and
even with brigade headquarters were poor
throughout the battles but Foulkes did not go
forward to discover what was happening. Much
can be blamed on the fog of war but a divisional
commander ought to be more than a conduit
for orders from higher formations. Foulkes
confined his interventions to orders to "get
going."67
Second Division's brigadiers had also failed
to play a decisive role in the battles of July.

Brigadier H.A. Young, commanding Sixth
Brigade, ignored the problems the Camerons
were having in St. Andre, insisting that the
start line for Operation "Spring" was secure.
Young did not go forward to determine the
situation for himself and does not seem to have
grasped how difficult it would be to stage a
night attack under these circumstances.
Brigadier Megill, who has been much criticized
for his role in "Spring", did go forward repeatedly
and did attempt to learn all he could about the
actual situation. Megill had been appalled by
the plan for "Spring," which seemed to have
been prepared by someone who could not read
a contour map and had never seen the ground. 68
Verrieres Ridge, he believed, ought to have
been cleared from east to west, not by uphill
attacks overlooked from three sides. Megill
had discussed this with Foulkes, after a 7th
Armoured Division liaison officer had suggested
that his men did not seriously believe that their
part in Phase II of "Spring" was possible, Megill
returned to Foulkes' headquarters where he
sought assurances that the brigades' left flank
would be protected by a vigorous British thrust.
Foulkes told him that 7th Armoured would go
all-out on the morning of 25 July and Megill
had to accept this assurance. 6 9
Once the operation began and his worst
fears were being confirmed on an hourly basis,
Megill could not bring himself to intervene.
When Foulkes ordered the Calgaries to press
their attack and told the Black Watch that
speed was essential, Megill simply passed the
orders on.70 When he learned over the "gunners
net" that Griffin had arranged an attack for
0930 hours, Megill wentto see the Black Watch
commander but did not overrule his decision.
Later that day Megill learned that Foulkes was
going t o r e n e w t h e a t t a c k u s i n g t h e
Maisonneuves and leaving them under Sixth
Brigade command. Foulkes and Brigadier
Young arrived at Fifth Brigade headquarters to
organize this venture and Foulkes began the
discussion by reporting that Simonds was
"furious at the failure which had occurred." 71
Megill protested the decision to order the
Maisonneuves into battle and a shouting match
erupted with Foulkes demanding to know if
Megill was challenging his orders. The result
61
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of all this was not, however, to cancel an illconceived plan but to conduct it under the
control of Fifth Brigade.

This article is taken from Chapters IV and V
of The Brigade: The Fifth Canadian Infantry
Brigade, 1939-1945. Stoney Creek: Fortress
Publications, October 1992.

Megill offered this explanation of his actions
on 25 July in a 1988 interview:
It w a s perfectly clear t h a t t h e attack should have been
called off at a very early stage In the morning. I suggested
this n o t later t h a n p e r h a p s 8:00 or 9:00 o'clock. Instead
t h e C o r p s c o m m a n d e r w a s p r e s s i n g t h e divisional
c o m m a n d e r a n d he w a s pressing us to get on with an
attack which we k n e w w a s almost hopeless. Under these
c i r c u m s t a n c e s one does not quit. You do as m u c h as you
possibly can a n d hope t h a t someone will see the light a n d
give you some relief.72

If Phillip Griffin had lived he would no doubt
have offered a similar explanation.
After Operation "Spring" failed and it became
apparent that the Americans had broken
through the German defences, Montgomery
changed his plans again and issued a new
directive. He noted that six of the ten Panzer
divisions were concentrated in the open country
south of Caen, so "further large scale efforts in
this sector were unlikely to succeed." British
Second Army was therefore to regroup and
attack with not less than six divisions on the
Army's right flank at Caumont. This operation,
code named "Bluecoat", drew all three British
armoured divisions to the west, forcing a
postponement of any armoured thrust east of
the Orne towards Falaise, but the Germans did
not know this.
The Canadian effort at Verrieres Ridge,
m a r r e d as it was by poor o p e r a t i o n a l
intelligence, communication failures and the
kind of mistakes inexperienced troops were
bound to make, was nevertheless a successful
military operation. The enemy responded to
"Spring" with co-ordinated counter attacks by
elements of two Panzer divisions. Their
attempts to evict the Canadians from Verrieres
village and St. Andre cost the enemy heavy
casualties and distracted attention from the
vital part of the front where an American
breakthrough turned into the long-awaited
break out. Operation "Spring" may not have
been planned as a holding operation but it
certainly became a very successful one.
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